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Abstract
We use a unique mainly hand‐collected dataset to assess the impact of directors’
trades on IPOs’ long‐term returns. We ﬁnd that IPOs where directors are net sellers
are more likely to generate positive long‐run returns which occur mostly before the
sell trades, suggesting that directors sell when their IPOs reach their optimal
values. Conversely, IPOs where directors are net buyers underperform
signiﬁcantly. Our results are not consistent with insider trading in seasoned
ﬁrms, partly because the valuation uncertainty of IPOs and the speciﬁc motivations
to trade weaken the precision of the trades’ informativeness.
Keywords: long run IPO performance, insider trades, London Stock Exchange,
market timing
JEL classification: G12, G14, G24
1. Introduction
Previous studies show that IPOs generate no or negative excess returns in the long run,
despite their relatively high exposure to market risk and level of underpricing.1 This
relatively low performance emanates from a combination of extreme differences of
We gratefully acknowledge comments from an anonymous referee, seminar participants at
Cass Business School, Manchester Business School and Nottingham Business School. All
remaining errors are our own responsibility. Correspondence: Meziane Lasfer.
1Ritter and Welch (2002) ﬁnd that the average beta of their IPOs in 1980‐2001 of 1.73. The
asymmetric models suggest that IPOs underprice on purpose to subsequently be able to sell
further shares at a higher price, and as a result, the long‐run returns should be high (e.g.,
Benveniste and Spindt, 1989; Jenkinson and Ljungqvist, 2001).
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opinion among investors, costly short selling, and small public ﬂoats on many IPOs.2 In
this paper, we contribute to this extensive literature by assessing whether the trading
behaviour of insiders, deﬁned as board members, affects IPO long‐run performance. We
follow previous studies on insider trading (e.g., Seyhun, 1998; Lakonishok and
Lee, 2001) and expect directors to know better the true value of their IPO than outside
investors and their trades will be informative. Since IPOs underperform because of high
information asymmetries (Ritter and Welch, 2002), we test the hypothesis that directors’
trades increase the long‐run stock price accuracy and discovery by mitigating the
relatively signiﬁcant information asymmetries inherent in IPOs, thus leading to a more
efﬁcient long‐run pricing.
Huddart and Ke (2007) argue that, in the case of insider trading, both Grossman and
Stiglitz (1980) price‐taking model and Kyle (1985) imperfect competition model, predict
that higher information asymmetry leads to more positive (negative) abnormal returns
following buy (sell) trades, and, thus, higher returns to directors. Given the great
uncertainty about the value of their IPOs, directors are likely to beneﬁt from their trades if
they hold perfect information, suggesting that their trades will only affect strongly stock
prices if their information is precise and credible, and if outsiders have lower information
about the value of the IPO. Therefore, in line with previous studies (e.g., Lakonishok and
Lee, 2001; Jenter, 2005), we expect directors to adopt contrarian strategies by buying
(selling) shares in under‐ (over‐) performing IPOs and those where they are net buyers
(sellers) will generate positive (negative) long‐term returns. This post‐trade stock price
behaviour will also be consistent with the agency theory framework (Jensen and
Meckling, 1976) because directors’ buy (sell) trades will lead to lower (higher) agency
conﬂicts, and, consequently, to higher (lower) long‐term returns. However, if they trade
for non‐private information reasons, such as liquidity and portfolio rebalancing
considerations, or if they sell because the lockup has expired, then we expect weak or
no relationship between insider trading and the long‐run returns of IPOs.
To test these hypotheses we construct a unique hand‐collected dataset of 830 UK IPOs
containing all information from prospectuses and insider trading events, and assess their
three‐year post‐IPO stock returns. We ﬁnd contrasting results to our expectations as IPOs
where directors are net sellers (Net Sell) generate positive returns, while those where they
are net buyers (Net Buy) underperform substantially throughout the 36‐months post‐IPO
period. We ﬁnd similar results using the style‐adjusted, equal and value‐weighted
cumulative abnormal returns, and the Fama and French (1993) three‐factor model. Our
regression results provide further support for these ﬁndings, as the coefﬁcient of the net
purchase ratio, NPR, deﬁned as directors’ net purchases over total transactions, measured
in terms of trading value or volume, is negative and signiﬁcant, suggesting that Net Sell
2See Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001), Ritter and Welch (2002), Ritter (2003), and Eckbo et
al. (2007) for extensive reviews. Although the long‐run underperfromance is observed in
many countries including the US (e.g., Ritter andWelch, 2002; Brav andGompers, 1997), UK
(Vismara et al., 2012; Levis, 2011; Espenlaub et al., 2000; Goergen et al., 2007), Greece
(Thomadakis et al., 2012), Switzerland (Kunz and Aggarwal, 1994), Finland
(Keloharju, 1993), and Australia (Finn and Higham, 1988), its signiﬁcance may suffer
from econometrics misspeciﬁcations (Fama, 1998) and may be sample period dependent
(Carter et al., 2011).
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(Net Buy) IPOs generate positive (negative) long‐run returns, even after accounting for the
IPOs’ fundamental factors.
We ﬁnd that the directors’ trades are not clustered around the lockup expiry dates; they
are relatively evenly distributed across the 36months sample period as themedian number
of years from the IPO date to the trading date is 1.45 years for both theNet Buy andNet Sell
samples. We, thus, split our sample period into months 2 to 18 and months 19 to 36. We
show that while the excess returns of Net Sell IPOs are positive in the ﬁrst, but not
signiﬁcant in the second period, they are negative for the Net Buy IPOs in both sub‐
periods.
We investigate further the causality of our results, the drivers of this asymmetric
performance, the timing ability of directors, and the information content of insider trading,
by assessing the market reaction to each individual trade. We ﬁnd that the pre‐sell trades’
excess returns are positive and signiﬁcant. On the announcement date, share prices
decrease, but, in the post trade period, they are mainly not signiﬁcant, suggesting that
directors time their trades by selling when they know that the price of their IPO is
optimised. In contrast, for the buy trades, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant negative excess returns in
both the pre‐ and post‐event periods.
We account for any look‐ahead bias in our results by running calendar time regressions
with the Fama‐French calendar time 3‐factor model starting from the date of the trade
rather than the IPO date. We expect the alpha of the buy (sell) trade portfolios to be
positive (negative) and signiﬁcant. We ﬁnd similar results as the portfolio of Net Sell (Net
Buy) IPOs earns positive (negative) alphas in the 3‐factor regressions. Our results imply
that directors’ trades are a response to past performance, but they are less likely to be based
on insider information and to predict future returns.
Overall, our results are puzzling as they indicate that the stock returns following the sell
trades are not negative, and, for the buy trades, they are negative and signiﬁcant in the pre‐
and the post‐trade periods. Our results are not consistent with the information content of
insider trading in seasoned ﬁrms documented in the previous literature (e.g.,
Seyhun, 1986; Lakonishok and Lee, 2001; Jenter, 2005). While the buy trades of
directors in failing IPOs may be consistent with the price support hypothesis3 our results
indicate that this aim is not achieved as the post‐trade returns are not positive,4 suggesting
that directors do not reverse the performance, systematically make losses on purchases,
and the market does not value their trades. Similarly, the sell trades are not undertaken
when the IPO is expecting bad news.
It is difﬁcult to rationalise why the IPO directors adopt such perplexing strategies. One
explanation could simply be that directors sell when they know that their IPO has reached
its optimal valuation, but that they purchase more stock in their underperforming IPO to
avoid admitting failure implicitly, in line with the disposition effect in behavioural
3 In general, underwriters can support prices by stimulating demand or by restricting supply in
the aftermarket and in many countries temporary price support in IPOs is legal including the
US (1934 Securities Act, Rule 10b‐7, since replaced by RegulationM) andUK (Securities and
Investment Board Rules, chapter III, Part 10). We do not have data to test for such trading by
the underwriters.
4One might wonder why directors would support prices rather than initiate a share repurchase
program. We do not ﬁnd evidence of share repurchases by these ﬁrms probably because of
lack of the necessary cash.
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ﬁnance. While this may remain a possibility, we are not aware of other means of testing
further this hypothesis.5 An alternative explanation for our results may be speciﬁc to IPOs.
Huddart and Ke (2007) argue that the impact of insider trading depends on two
fundamental factors: the precision of the insider’s information and the level of uncertainty
in the marketplace regarding the ﬁrm’s value. We consider that, unlike seasoned ﬁrms, in
the case of IPOs, there is great uncertainty about the value of the ﬁrm, and the directors’
signal is likely to be less precise, resulting in low excess returns, and thus lower
informativeness and weak signal. Nevertheless, we ﬁnd that Net Buy IPOs perform better
thanNo Trade IPOs, suggesting that the former IPOs could have had a worst performance
without the buy trades of directors. The Net Sell IPOs are likely to have low information
asymmetries as they performwell before the sell trades, but their signal is also weak as the
post‐trade returns are not negative, although the results suggest that these IPOs have
reached their optimal valuation.
We contribute to two main areas of research that are not so far considered conjointly:
IPO long‐run performance and insider trading. Since Ritter (1991) documented the long‐
run underperformance of IPOs, a number of studies have sought to link this intriguing
performance puzzle to factors such as prestigious underwriters and venture capital (VC)
backing (e.g., Brav and Gompers, 1997) and more recently to mergers and acquisitions
activity (Brau et al., 2012). We show that the trading activity of directors can also explain
this underperformance. Our regression results show that directors’ trades are affected by
the IPOs’ long‐run returns, but not strongly by the previously documented signalling
factors such as underpricing (Jenkinson and Ljungqvist, 2001), overhang (Mikkelson et
al., 1997), reputation of underwriters (Carter and Manaster, 1990), venture capitalist
(Brav and Gompers, 1997, Krishnan et al., 2011), and private equity backing
(Levis, 2011).6 Our results are also not consistent with the agency theory which predicts
a positive relationship between ownership structure and IPO long‐run performance.7
Moreover, unlike previous insider trading literature, which focussed mainly on seasoned
ﬁrms (See Korczak et al. (2010) for recent review), we do not ﬁnd, as in Lakonishok and
Lee (2001), that insider purchases, not sells, are more likely to predict future stock returns,
and insider trading informativeness is not affected by free ﬂoat, and is not more
pronounced in smaller ﬁrms or IPOs listed on the Alternative InvestmentMarket (AIM), a
5See Subrahmanyam (2007) and Barberis and Thaler (2003) for a review. Kaustia (2004)
argues that the disposition effect is clearly identiﬁable in the IPO market because the offer
price is a common purchase price. He ﬁnds that when the stock price is below the offer price
the volume is low, but the volume increases when the price surpasses the offer price for the
ﬁrst time, and when the stock achieves a new maximum and minimum price, consistent with
the reference price effect. This may apply mainly to periods closer to the IPO date, and we
think that the offer price cannot be considered as a reference price because three years’ time is
too long. Directors might also anchor on the initial price of their stock, which, unfortunately, is
not available.
6Doukas and Gonenc (2005) show that reputation of underwriters matters only for not VC
backed IPOs.
7Previous studies provide mixed evidence on this relationship. For example, Mikkelson et al.
(1997) show that the long‐run returns are unrelated to ownership structure, but Jain and Kini
(1994) ﬁnd a positive relation between post‐IPO operating performance and equity retention
by original shareholders.
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relatively less regulated market for mainly small and high growth ﬁrms. Our results also
do not support Marin and Oliver (2008) who ﬁnd that insiders sell up to 12 months before
large monthly price drops, but buy one month before large price jumps, and Jiang and
Zaman (2010) who show that insiders’ ability to predict future cash ﬂow news, rather than
their adoption of contrarian strategies, explains the predictive ability of their aggregate
trades. Overall, our results are likely to be speciﬁc to IPOs but raise further the puzzle as to
why the underperformance of IPOs does not revert after the directors’ purchases and why
IPOs do not underperform after their sell trades.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents our data and the
methodology. Section 3 provides the empirical results, and the conclusions are in
Section 4.
2. 2. Data and Methodology
We ﬁrst gather the list of the 1,117 IPOs that went public in the London Stock Exchange,
(LSE), in both the Main market and the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) between
January 1999 and 2006 from the LSEwebsite, together with the data on the quotationmarket
(AIM or Main market), admission date, country of incorporation, issue price, market value,
money raised, name of the broker, and for AIM IPOs, the advisor. We then download
prospectuses from Perfect Filings database and hand‐collect all information relating to
lockup arrangements, including lockup dates, directors’ ownership before and after the IPO
and the fraction of their shares locked up, percentage sold at the time of the IPO, institutional
ownership, venture capital backing and names of underwriters. We extract any delisting
dates, and other accounting and stock market data, which include daily stock prices and
indices to compute the stock returns, market capitalisation, which we use as proxy for size,
accounting return on assets to measure proﬁtability, and price‐to‐book ratio to proxy for
growth fromDataStream.We exclude 77 IPOs forwhichwe could not ﬁnd the prospectuses,
15 with missing share price data, and 195 with no lockup date or ownership data from the
prospectuses. Our ﬁnal sample includes 830 (74%) ﬁrms with complete data.We also obtain
information on subsequent seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) from London Stock Exchange,
and any M&A announcement from Thomson One Banker database.
Finally, we use a ﬁfth database, Directors’ Deals, which records all the trades
undertaken by directors in the UKmarket. The database includes news items on directors’
trades disclosed by UK quoted ﬁrms in the Regulatory News Service (RNS), such as
transaction price, amount, and value, post‐transaction holding, change in holding, name
and position of the director, and announcement and transaction dates.8 We exclude a
8The UK Model Code prescribes much faster reporting of directors’ dealings. The directors
must inform their company as soon as possible after the transaction and no later than the ﬁfth
business day after a transaction for their own account or on behalf of their spouses and children
(Hillier and Marshall, 2002). In turn, the ﬁrm must inform the LSE without delay and no later
than the end of the business day following receipt of the information. This implies that the
information reaches the market as late as 6 days after transaction. In contrast, in the USA,
during the pre‐Sarbanes‐Oxley period, directors have to report their trades on the 10th of the
month following the transaction, resulting in a maximum delay of between 10 and 42 days,
depending on the trading date. As a result, most previous studies could not analyse insider‐
trading event on or before the lockup expiry date.
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number of observations not related to private information, such as exercise of options or
derivatives, script dividends, bonus shares, rights issues, awards made to directors under
incentive plans or reinvestment plans, and all directors’ transactions in investment
companies. After this screening, we obtain 36,943 directors’ trades.We check the data for
errors and exclude 2,952 (8%) trades as the difference in announcement and transaction
date is more than the 5 days legally required in the UK (Korczak et al., 2010). Our ﬁnal
sample includes 33,991 directors’ trades in 2,664 listed companies, split into 26,268
(77%) buy, and 7,723 (23%) sell trades. We, then, match all director trading event dates
with the dates of the IPOs, and select IPOs where directors’ trading occurs during the
three‐year period of IPO. We ﬁnd 543 (65%) ﬁrms with at least one director trade during
the 36 months period after IPO. We exclude 31 trades that occur on the same day. We
identify 791 sell trades in 231 IPOs and 2,102 buy trades in 480 IPOs. Finally, we follow
Lakonishok and Lee (2001) and deﬁne the Net Purchases Ratio, NPR, as:
NPR ¼ Purchases Sells
Total Trades
We ﬁnd 190 (35%) IPOswith negativeNPR, referred to asNet Sell sub‐sample, and 353
(65%) with positive NPR, classiﬁed as Net Buy sub‐sample, using both the number of
transactions (NPR transaction), and the value of the trades (NPR value).
We use various methodologies to test our hypotheses. We ﬁrst use the standard event
studymethodology to compute the cumulative abnormal returns over 3 years after the ﬁrst
month of the IPO. The abnormal returns are the monthly returns on each IPO less the
return on the Financial Times All Share Index, FTA, which is a more representative index
as it includes small as well as large companies. We also use the AIM index for our AIM
IPOs and FTA for IPOs on the Main market, and compute both the equally‐ and value‐
weighted CARs. Following Ritter and Welch (2002), we compute the style‐adjusted
CARs, and buy and hold returns, BHARs, as the difference between the returns on an IPO
and a style‐matched ﬁrm, deﬁned as the closest market capitalisation and book‐to‐market
ratio listed ﬁrm to our IPO.We select the control ﬁrm only once, and if it is delisted prior to
the IPO returns’ ending date, we replace it with another matching ﬁrm on a point‐forward
basis. If the IPO is delisted, we compute the excess returns up to the date of delisting. We
also use the market model to compute the abnormal returns over the event window [40,
þ40] relative to the trading date, and the lockup expiry date. The a and b are from the
regression of the security returns against the corresponding market indices, the AIM all
share price9 and FTA, for AIM and Main Market IPOs, respectively, over the period
[290, 41] trading days relative to each event date. We estimate the Fama‐French
(1993) calendar time regressions as in Ritter and Welch (2002):
Rpt  Rf t ¼ aþ btðRMt  Rf tÞ þ bt1ðRMt1  Rf t1Þ þ g tSMBt þ g t1SMBt1
þ dtHMLt þ dt1HMLt1 þ ept
where Rpt –Rft is the excess return over the risk free rate on a portfolio in time period t, RMt
– Rft is the market risk premium, with FTA as a proxy for RMt, and Rft the 3 months
Treasury bill rate. SMBt is the return on small ﬁrms minus the return on large ﬁrms, and
HMLt is the return on high book‐to‐market return minus the return of the low book‐to‐
9We also use the Hoare Govett Smaller Companies Index as the market index. Our results are
similar.
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market portfolio.We extract the relevant data for size and book‐to‐market indices fromK.
French data library: http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_
library.html#International. The b is the sum of bt and bt‐1. We use similar method to
assess our IPOs’ exposures to SMB and HML factors. The signalling and agency theory
hypotheses predict that a Net Buy > a Net Sell.
We relate the CARs to NPR after controlling for other factors deﬁned in the previous
literature, such as ﬁrst day return, size, insider ownership (overhang), the underwriter
reputation, venture capitalist backing, lockup length and expiry date returns, period
dummies, and Seasoned EquityOfferings (SEO) to captureMyers andMajluf (1984) effects.
We account for the impact of takeover activity, as reported by Brau et al. (2012) by using the
actual takeover obtained from Thomson One Banker database, and by following Brar et al.
(2008)method.We ﬁrst build a two‐waymatrix by size and growth in turnover.We consider
that large and high (small and low) growth ﬁrms are less (more) likely to be subject to a
takeover bid, and thus assigned a value of zero (one).We then classify ﬁrms in the remaining
two quadrants into yield groups: high yield IPOs have a higher probability, and, thus take a
value of one, while those with low yield have a value of zero.
Finally, we run various logit regressions to determine the characteristics of the Net Sell
and Net Buy subsamples. We use various explanatory variables to capture the IPO
fundamentals. We use size, the log of market value of equity at the IPO date, to assess
whether insider trading occurs in large, thus, less risky ﬁrms. We test for robustness by
using a dummy variable for ﬁrms listed on the Alternative Investment Market (AIM). In
addition, we include risk, the standard deviation of the stock returns over the 36‐months
period, and ﬁrst day underpricing. We use market‐to‐book ratio, and CAR‐40,‐2 relative to
trading dates, to assess whether directors are contrarians. We measure insider ownership
structures using shares locked, and lockup lengths. We also account for ownership of
outsiders, including VC backing, and institutional holding, and for liquidity using
overhang and free ﬂoat. Finally, we use takeover and SEO probabilities, to assess trading
on insider information and prestigious underwriters to evaluate the impact of corporate
brokers in the UK.
3. Empirical Results
3.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics of our sample ﬁrms. Panel A. shows that the
median length of the lockup is 365 days, in line with Espenlaub et al. (2001) and Hoque and
Lasfer (2009),10 and more than double the 180 days in the US (Brav and Gompers, 2003;
Field and Hanka, 2001). The average free ﬂoat, deﬁned, in line with Levis (1993) and
Goergen et al. (2006), as the proportion of money raised in IPO relative to total market value
of the company at the time of IPO, amounts to 39.16%, and theOverhang, deﬁned as shares
retained to shares sold, amounts to 3.85%. The shares locked amount to 94.52%of the shares
sold on the IPO date (equivalent to 29.5% of the shares outstanding). The underpricing of
22.5% is consistent with previous evidence (e.g., Chambers and Dimson, 2009). The
10Espenlaub et al. (2001) ﬁnd mean (median) lockup of 561 (730) days in 1992‐1998 when
the lockup contracts are compulsory for mineral and scientiﬁc research based ﬁrms with less
than three years trading records.
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Table 1
Descriptive statistics of IPOs and directors’ trading
10th Percentile Median Mean 90th Percentile
Panel A. Descriptive statistics of IPOs fundamentals, N ¼ 830 IPOs
Lockup length 306 365 391 548
Free float (%) 12.38 32.85 39.16 81.19
Overhang (%) 0.23 2.04 3.85 7.08
Shares locked (%) 70 100 94.52 100
Underpricing (%) 1.50 9.90 22.50 51.30
Market value of equity(2008 £m) 3.20 21.60 140.20 204.10
Market‐to‐book 0.88 3.01 3.88 11.15
Return on Assets 52.6 2.60 34.60 11.10
Panel B: Descriptive statistics of the sell trades, N ¼ 791 in 231 IPOs
No of trades 1.00 2.00 3.56 8.00
Trade time after IPO(years) 0.52 1.45 1.52 2.63
No of Shares (000) 19.51 200.00 858.94 1,590.00
Value of shares (2008 £000) 24.24 298.57 2,334.45 2,940.68
Trade as % of market value 0.02 0.29 1.01 2.37
Percentage holding 0.04 1.35 7.14 22.44
Market capitalisation (£m) 9.00 112.35 537.60 1244.42
Panel C: Descriptive statistics of the buy trades, N ¼ 2102 in 480 IPOs
No of trades 1.00 3.00 4.38 9.10
Trade time after IPO(years) 0.41 1.45 1.46 2.61
No of shares (000) 5.00 27.00 172.88 250.00
Value of shares(2008 £000) 2.81 13.30 231.61 99.14
Trade as % of market value 0.005 0.05 0.21 0.41
Percentage holding 0.01 0.63 5.27 15.65
Market capitalisation (£m) 3.84 26.48 248.14 352.89
Panel E. Annual distribution of the sample IPOs and directors’ trades
Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
IPOs 39 144 59 44 39 159 201 146
Average money raised (£m) 187.2 253.5 106.8 84.1 100.0 51.6 73.6 138.4
Lockup length 427 374 410 437 404 392 388 375
Buy Trades (%) 4 19 8 7 6 22 23 12
Sell Trades (%) 5 8 8 6 6 27 29 11
Net Buy (% IPO) 2 20 7 5 6 20 23 17
Net Sell (% IPO) 7 8 11 6 6 25 25 13
This table reports the descriptive statistics for 830 IPOs and directors trades in those IPOs from 1999 to 2006. Lockup
length is lockup period in days, free ﬂoat deﬁned as the proportion ofmoney raised in IPO relative to total market value
of the company, Overhang is the ratio of the proportion retained to the proportion sold, Shares locked is the ratio of
shares locked relative to shares sold in the IPO.Underpricing is the percent return on the ﬁrst day from the offer price
to the closing price, Market value is the offer price times shares outstanding in 2008 millions of Pound Sterling
constant terms.Market‐to‐book is the ratio of market capitalisation at the IPO divided by the book value of the equity
in the ﬁrst reporting period after IPO, Return on assets is the net income divided by total assets in the ﬁrst reporting
period after the IPO. Panel B andC report the distribution of the buy and sell trades that occurredwithin 3 years of IPO.
Percentage Holding is the percent of total shares owned by the director who traded. CAR‐42,‐2 is the cumulative
abnormal return 40 day pre‐event window, where the abnormal returns are based on the standard event study
methodology with a and b computed from a regression of stock returns on the FTSE All Share Price Index for main
market companies and AIMAll Share Price Index for AIM companies. In Panel E,Net Buy (Net Sell) is the proportion
of IPOs with positive (negative) ratio of (Buys – Sells)/Total trade, AverageMoney Raised is the ratio of money raised
in 2008 £m over the number of IPOs.
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analysis of the fundamentals indicates that, while the average market value of equity of our
ﬁrms is £140m (about $210m), our sample includes small as well as large ﬁrms. Consistent
with US evidence (e.g., Brav and Gompers, 2003), our IPOs are loss making as the average
return on equity is ‐34.6% and high growth as the average market‐to‐book ratio is 3.88.
Panels B. and C. report the distribution of the buy and sell trades during the three‐year
post‐IPO period. On average, there are 3.56 sell and 4.38 buy trades, occurring roughly 1.5
years after IPO, suggesting that most of the trades occur after the lockup expiration date. The
results indicate, however, that the number and value of shares sold are signiﬁcantly higher
than the buy trades; the value of shares sold of £2.3m is 10 times those bought of £0.23m.We
also observe this difference (1.01% vs. 0.21%) when we scale the value of the trades by
market capitalisation to account for size impact, as the average market value of IPOs subject
to buy trades of £248m is signiﬁcantly lower than the £538m for the sell trade IPOs. Overall,
the buy trades are more frequent, but they appear to be smaller than the sell trades.
Consequently, the average holding of directors is signiﬁcantly larger in IPOswith sell trades.
Panel E. reports the annual distribution of sample IPOs and directors’ trades. Consistent
with previous evidence (e.g., Chambers and Dimson, 2009), the volume of IPOs is relatively
high in the ‘Bubble’ periods of 2000, and 2004‐2006, but 2001‐2003 is a relatively quiet
period. The next row reports the distribution of the amount of money raised. IPOs appear to
be relatively larger in 1999 to 2000 period, with an average of £200m per issue, compared to
£88m in the post‐2001 period. In terms of the length of the lockup, the results show that the
maximum of 437 days is in 2002 and the minimum of 374 is in 2000, but the distribution is
relatively homogeneous, and in each year, the average is higher than 180 days documented in
the USA. Interestingly, the analysis of the annual distribution of director trades and the Net
Sell and the Net Buy sub‐samples, reported in the last two rows, indicates that both the buy
and sell trades are more frequent in 2004‐2006, except for the 19% buy trades in 2000. In
1999, the total number of trades is 124, split into 84 (4% of 2,102) buy and 40 (5% of 791)
sell trades, while the respective trades in 2005 are 483 (23%), and 229 (29%).We ﬁnd similar
distribution for the number of Net Buy and Net Sell IPOs. Only a small number of IPOs are
subject to director trading activity in 1999‐2003, except 2000 with 166 IPOs (20%). We
account for this time effect in our regressions.
3.2 The long‐run performance of IPOs
Table 2 reports the long‐run performance over various sub‐periods after the IPO date and
overmonths 2 to 18, and 19 to 36, as Figure 1 shows that the periodicity of the buy and sell
trades is relatively evenly distributed across these two sub‐periods. Following Ritter and
Welch (2002), we report in Panel A. andB. the style adjusted buy and hold average returns
(BHARs) and cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) where the style‐matched ﬁrm is the
closest market capitalisation and book‐to‐market ratio listed ﬁrm. In Panel C and D we
report equally weighted and value weighted CARs with a ¼ 0 and b ¼ 1.11 In Panel A
11We ﬁnd similar results when we compute the rawBHARs. Brav et al. (2000) argue that tests
of underperformance based on BHARs are biased towards rejecting the null hypothesis of no
underperformance. Moreover, the raw equally‐weighted returns may result in biased long‐
term returns as they are not compared to a benchmark and they may suffer from size effects.
We report matched‐ﬁrm approach results as under this method the underperformance
disappears or shrinks (e.g., Brav and Gompers, 1997; Ritter and Welch, 2002).
© 2013 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
Directors’ Dealing and Post‐IPO Performance 9
UN
CO
RR
EC
TE
D P
RO
OF
S
T
ab
le
2
L
on
g‐
ru
n
IP
O
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
M
on
th
s
E
ve
nt
w
in
do
w
s
N
1
6
12
24
36
2‐
18
19
‐3
6
P
an
el
A
.
S
ty
le
‐a
dj
us
te
d
B
H
A
R
s
A
ll
IP
O
s
83
0
0
.0
02
(0
.2
7)
0
.0
16
(
0.
50
)
0
.0
76
**
*
(
2.
02
)
0
.1
39
**
*
(
3.
15
)
0
.1
83
**
*
(
3.
43
)
0
.0
55
(
1.
36
)
0
.2
26
**
*
(
2.
62
)
A
IM
69
1
0
.0
13
(
1.
33
)
0
.0
13
(
0.
36
)
0
.0
70
(
1.
64
)
0
.1
50
**
*
(
2.
96
)
0
.1
87
**
*
(
3.
03
)
0
.0
45
(
0.
98
)
0
.2
67
**
(
2.
62
)
M
ai
n
13
9
0.
04
9*
**
(3
.1
9)
0
.0
30
(
0.
48
)
0
.1
06
(
1.
44
)
0
.0
83
(
1.
09
)
0
.1
61
**
(
1.
92
)
0
.1
01
(
1.
47
)
0
.0
20
(
0.
25
)
A
IM
‐M
ai
n
(p
‐v
al
ue
)
0.
00
0.
80
0.
67
0.
46
0.
80
0.
50
0.
06
N
o
tr
ad
e
IP
O
s
28
7
0
.0
23
(
1.
46
)
0
.0
24
(
0.
34
)
0
.1
33
**
*
(
2.
38
)
0
.3
40
**
*
(
5.
55
)
0
.3
61
**
*
(
5.
26
)
0
.2
29
**
*
(
3.
96
)
0
.4
38
**
(
1.
89
)
A
IM
25
7
0
.0
32
(
1.
93
)
0
.0
35
(
0.
46
)
0
.1
35
**
(
2.
28
)
0
.3
44
**
*
(
5.
14
)
0
.3
62
**
*
(
4.
89
)
0
.2
24
**
*
(
3.
59
)
0
.4
70
*
(
1.
85
)
M
ai
n
30
0.
05
7
(1
.4
5)
0.
07
4
(0
.4
4)
0
.1
11
(
0.
68
5)
0
.3
03
**
(
2.
44
)
0
.3
4*
*
(
2.
50
)
0
.2
7*
(
1.
83
)
0
.1
61
(
0.
77
)
A
IM
‐M
ai
n
(p
‐v
al
ue
)
0.
04
0.
55
0.
89
0.
77
0.
91
0.
76
0.
35
N
et
bu
y
IP
O
s
35
3
0.
01
2
(0
.9
3)
0
.0
86
**
*
(
2.
28
)
0
.1
85
**
*
(
2.
95
)
0
.2
77
**
*
(
4.
09
)
0
.3
36
**
*
(
4.
50
)
0
.1
52
**
*
(
2.
55
)
0
.2
04
**
*
(
3.
49
)
A
IM
30
4
0.
00
9
(0
.6
4)
0
.0
67
(
1.
54
)
0
.1
72
**
(
2.
44
)
0
.2
73
**
*
(
3.
54
)
0
.3
36
**
*
(
3.
98
)
0
.1
40
**
(
2.
09
)
0
.2
18
**
*
(
3.
35
)
M
ai
n
49
0.
03
3
(1
.3
2)
0
.1
99
*
(
1.
76
)
0
.2
71
**
(
2.
13
)
0
.2
97
**
*
(
3.
16
)
0
.3
35
**
*
(
2.
76
)
0
.2
23
**
(
2.
19
)
0
.1
14
(
1.
11
)
A
IM
‐M
ai
n
(p
‐v
al
ue
)
0.
41
0.
33
0.
50
0.
84
0.
99
0.
50
0.
39
N
et
S
el
l
IP
O
s
19
0
0.
00
1
(0
.1
1)
0.
12
7*
**
(2
.8
9)
0.
21
2*
**
(2
.7
5)
0.
42
1*
**
(4
.0
8)
0.
37
1*
**
(2
.4
9)
0.
39
0*
**
(3
.9
5)
0.
05
5
(0
.7
0)
A
IM
13
0
0
.0
25
(
1.
60
)
0.
16
0
(1
.0
8)
0.
29
5*
**
(2
.9
2)
0.
52
2*
**
(3
.8
6)
0.
50
8*
*
(2
.4
6)
0.
53
0*
**
(3
.9
8)
0.
02
1
(0
.2
1)
M
ai
n
60
0.
05
8
(2
.6
7)
0.
05
6*
**
(2
.6
8)
0.
03
2
(0
.3
0)
0.
20
1
(1
.4
5)
0.
07
3
(0
.4
9)
0.
08
5
(0
.7
7)
0.
12
8
(0
.9
8)
A
IM
‐M
ai
n
(p
‐v
al
ue
)
0.
01
0.
19
0.
07
0.
10
0.
09
0.
02
0.
52
P
an
el
B
.
S
ty
le
‐a
dj
us
te
d
C
A
R
s
A
ll
IP
O
s
83
0
0.
02
2*
(1
.8
9)
0
.0
02
(
0.
05
)
0
.0
56
(
1.
37
)
0
.1
75
**
*
(3
.0
5)
0
.2
61
**
*
(
3.
72
)
0
.1
23
**
(
2.
54
)
0
.1
61
**
*
(
3.
23
)
N
o
T
ra
de
IP
O
s
28
7
0.
01
2
(1
.0
2)
0
.0
58
**
(
2.
04
)
0
.2
74
**
(
6.
76
)
0
.4
20
**
*
(
7.
32
)
0
.5
13
**
*
(
7.
30
)
0
.3
21
**
*
(
6.
64
)
0
.2
04
**
*
(
4.
10
)
N
et
bu
y
IP
O
s
35
3
0.
02
6*
*
(2
.1
9)
0
.0
17
(
0.
61
)
0
.1
07
**
(
2.
64
)
0
.2
80
**
*
(
4.
88
)
0
.4
20
**
*
(
5.
97
)
0
.1
92
**
*
(
3.
98
)
0
.2
53
**
*
(
5.
10
)
N
et
se
ll
IP
O
s
19
0
0.
02
7*
*
(2
.3
3)
0.
08
2*
*
(2
.8
5)
0.
14
5*
**
(3
.4
5)
0.
23
9*
**
(4
.1
7)
0.
23
9*
**
(3
.4
0)
0.
18
7*
**
(3
.8
8)
0.
02
4
(0
.4
9)
P
an
el
C
.
E
qu
al
w
ei
gh
te
d
C
A
R
s
A
ll
IP
O
s
83
0
0.
00
5
(0
.3
6)
0
.0
23
(
0.
71
)
0
.1
06
**
(
2.
33
)
0
.2
70
**
*
(
4.
22
)
0
.3
65
**
*
(
4.
66
)
0
.1
62
**
*
(
3.
10
)
0
.2
08
**
*
(
3.
75
)
N
o
T
ra
de
IP
O
s
28
7
0
.0
16
(
1.
19
)
0
.0
81
**
*
(
2.
52
)
0
.2
19
**
*
(
4.
85
)
0
.5
26
**
*
(
8.
22
)
0
.6
79
**
*
(
8.
66
)
0
.3
40
**
*
(
6.
50
)
0
.3
24
**
*
(
5.
84
)
N
et
bu
y
IP
O
s
35
3
0.
02
2*
(1
.6
5)
0
.0
51
(
1.
59
)
0
.1
79
**
*
(
3.
95
)
0
.3
75
**
*
(
5.
85
)
0
.4
83
**
*
(
6.
16
)
0
.2
51
**
*
(
4.
80
)
0
.2
54
**
*
(
4.
57
)
N
et
se
ll
IP
O
s
19
0
0.
00
0
(0
.0
3)
0.
07
8*
**
(2
.4
5)
0.
12
0*
**
(2
.6
5)
0.
14
9*
**
(2
.3
3)
0.
13
3*
(1
.7
0)
0.
15
3*
**
(2
.9
3)
0
.0
20
(
0.
37
)
© 2013 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
10 Haﬁz Hoque and Meziane Lasfer
UN
CO
RR
EC
TE
D P
RO
OF
S
T
ab
le
2
C
on
tin
ue
d
M
on
th
s
E
ve
nt
w
in
do
w
s
N
1
6
12
24
36
2‐
18
19
‐3
6
P
an
el
D
.
V
al
ue
w
ei
gh
te
d
C
A
R
s
A
ll
IP
O
s
83
0
0.
02
8
(1
.1
6)
0
.0
59
(
0.
99
)
0
.2
56
**
*
(
3.
05
)
0
.3
99
**
*
(
3.
37
)
0
.3
51
**
(
2.
41
)
0
.3
03
**
*
(
3.
04
)
0
.0
76
(
0.
74
)
N
o
T
ra
de
IP
O
s
28
7
0
.0
03
(
0.
11
)
0
.0
61
(
1.
03
)
0
.2
74
**
*
(
3.
27
)
0
.5
37
**
*
(
4.
53
)
0
.5
30
**
*
(
3.
65
)
0
.4
36
**
*
(
4.
38
)
0
.0
92
(
0.
89
)
N
et
bu
y
IP
O
s
35
3
0.
05
6*
**
(2
.2
9)
0
.0
36
(
0.
60
)
0
.3
43
**
*
(
4.
09
)
0
.6
39
**
*
(
5.
39
)
0
.6
55
**
*
(
4.
51
)
0
.4
87
**
*
(
4.
89
)
0
.2
23
**
(
2.
17
)
N
et
se
ll
IP
O
s
19
0
0.
01
9
(0
.7
6)
0
.0
81
(
1.
37
)
0
.1
59
*
(
1.
89
)
0
.0
81
(
0.
68
)
0.
05
6
(0
.3
8)
0
.0
41
(
0.
41
)
0.
07
9
(0
.7
7)
T
hi
s
ta
bl
e
pr
es
en
ts
th
e
bu
y‐
an
d‐
ho
ld
ab
no
rm
al
re
tu
rn
s
(B
H
A
R
s)
an
d
cu
m
ul
at
iv
e
ab
no
rm
al
re
tu
rn
s
(C
A
R
s)
fo
rU
K
IP
O
s
fo
r3
‐y
ea
rp
os
t‐
IP
O
pe
ri
od
.T
he
ab
no
rm
al
re
tu
rn
s
ar
e
ba
se
d
on
th
e
F
T
S
E
A
ll
S
ha
re
P
ri
ce
In
de
x
fo
rm
ai
n
m
ar
ke
tI
P
O
s
an
d
A
IM
A
ll
S
ha
re
P
ri
ce
In
de
x
fo
rA
IM
IP
O
s.
P
an
el
A
an
d
B
re
po
rt
th
e
st
yl
e‐
ad
ju
st
ed
(M
/B
an
d
si
ze
)B
H
A
R
s
an
d
C
A
R
s,
re
sp
ec
tiv
el
y.
A
ll
IP
O
s
in
cl
ud
es
83
0
U
K
IP
O
s
ov
er
th
e
pe
ri
od
19
99
‐2
00
6.
N
o
T
ra
de
(2
87
IP
O
s)
in
cl
ud
e
IP
O
s
w
ith
ou
ta
ny
in
si
de
rt
ra
di
ng
du
ri
ng
36
m
on
th
s
pe
ri
od
af
te
rI
P
O
.I
P
O
s
w
ith
in
si
de
rt
ra
de
s
(5
43
IP
O
s)
in
cl
ud
e
an
y
IP
O
s
w
ith
at
le
as
to
ne
in
si
de
rt
ra
de
du
ri
ng
36
m
on
th
s
pe
ri
od
af
te
rI
P
O
,s
pl
it
in
to
19
0
N
et
Se
ll
IP
O
s
an
d
35
3
N
et
B
uy
IP
O
s.
T
he
fo
rm
er
ar
e
IP
O
s
w
ith
po
si
tiv
e
N
P
R
w
hi
le
th
e
la
tte
r
ha
ve
ne
ga
tiv
e
N
P
R
,w
he
re
N
P
R
is
th
e
di
ff
er
en
ce
be
tw
ee
n
to
ta
lv
al
ue
of
pu
rc
ha
se
s
an
d
se
lls
di
vi
de
d
by
to
ta
lv
al
ue
of
sh
ar
es
tr
ad
ed
ov
er
th
is
36
m
on
th
s
pe
ri
od
af
te
r
IP
O
.T
he
re
tu
rn
s
ex
cl
ud
e
ﬁ
rs
t
da
y
re
tu
rn
s.
**
*,
**
,*
de
no
te
s
si
gn
iﬁ
ca
nt
at
0.
01
,
0.
05
an
d
0.
10
le
ve
l,
re
sp
ec
tiv
el
y.
© 2013 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
Directors’ Dealing and Post‐IPO Performance 11
UN
CO
RR
EC
TE
D 
PR
OO
FS
we compare IPOs listed on the AIM and the Main market. Since the impact of AIM is
relatively marginal and the results are relatively similar across the estimation methods
used, we do not distinguish between AIM and Main in the remaining panels and in the
OLS regressions.
Our results are relatively consistent across these different methodologies. Overall, they
indicate that the excess returns are not homogeneous across our sample ﬁrms. In
particular, the overall underperformance of our sample of IPOs appears to be driven by
IPOswithout insider trading andNet Buy IPOswhich underperform consistently across all
our sample period except the ﬁrst few months of quotation, while Net Sell IPOs over‐
perform. For example, the style‐adjusted BHARs reported in Panel A in months 19 to 36
are ‐22.6%, ‐43.8%, and ‐20.4%, for All,No Trade, andNet Buy IPOs, respectively, while
the Net Sell IPOs generate positive returns throughout the sample period. We show these
results in Figure 2. Overall, our results suggest that these trades are less likely to be
informative, directors do not trade on insider information, but they are likely to sell when
their IPOs reach their peak.
3.3 The timing of the excess returns
In this section, we assess whether the positive (negative) excess returns of Net Sell (Net
Buy) IPOs occur before or after the trades of directors. We assess directly the market
reaction around each individual buy and sell trade undertaken by directors. Table 3, Panel
A, shows that on the announcement date of buy trades, share prices increase substantially
by 3.59%, compared to the 1.16% reported by Fidrmuc et al. (2006) for UK seasoned
ﬁrms. In the various pre‐event periods, the CARs are all negative and signiﬁcant,
suggesting that the trades occur when the IPO is underperforming. Interestingly, the post‐
event CARs are all negative suggesting that the positive signal of the buy trades is short‐
lived. For the sell trades, the pre‐event period CARs are positive and highly signiﬁcant,
but on the event and post‐event periods, they are not constantly negative and signiﬁcant.
Fig. 1. Distribution of buy and sell trades
This ﬁgure reports the distribution of the proportion of the buy and sell trades over the 36 months period
after IPOs. The sample includes 2,102 buy trades and 791 sell trades undertaken in 830UK IPOs over the
period 1999–2006. The event periods 2 to 18 and 19 to 26 months show whether the trades occur during
the ﬁrst or second part of our sample period.
© 2013 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
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These results suggest that, consistent with previous insider trading literature (e.g.,
Seyhun, 1986), directors adopt contrarian strategies by buying (selling) after signiﬁcant
share price decreases (increases), but the informativeness of these trades is weak, as stock
prices do not increase (decrease) after their buy (sell) trades. Although the negative
announcement dates abnormal returns implies that directors convey bad news to the
market by selling shares, in line with Brau and Fawcett (2006), the impact is short lived.
Our results also imply that since the returns in the period before the sell trades are positive,
directors may have stopped the positive performance of the IPO. Without such trades,
returns may have carried on increasing, although they are small.
In Panel B, we aggregate these trades forNet Buy andNet Sell sub‐samples. The CARs for
Net Buy sub‐sample are all negative and signiﬁcant, with the exception of the positive returns
of 2.60% on the announcement dates. In contrast, for the Net Sell sample, the CARs are all
positive, except for CAR‐1,þ1 and CARþ2,þ40. However, the pre‐trade CARs are relatively
larger than the post‐trade CARs, suggesting that, in line with the last two columns in Table 2,
the pre‐trade period is likely to drive the excess returns for the Net Sell sample.
3.4 Fama and French (1993) Results
We expand our robustness checks using the Fama‐French (1993) regressions model. In
line with previous insider trading literature, we use the director trading as event and
calculate Fama‐French regressions using trade dates, because our results on CAR and
BHAR using IPOs may suffer from the look‐ahead bias, as investors could not separate
Fig. 2. Style‐adjusted buy‐and‐hold long‐run returns of net buy and net sell IPOs
This ﬁgure presents the Buy‐and‐hold returns relative to size and book‐to‐market control ﬁrms for 3‐
years post‐IPO period.We construct our samples as follows.We ﬁrst select IPOs with insider trades (543
out of 830), which include any IPOs with at least one insider trade during 36 months period after IPO.
Then we compute the Net purchase ratio,NPR, as the difference between the total value of purchases and
sells, divided by the total value of shares traded over this 36 months period after IPO. IPOs with positive
(negative) NPR are classiﬁed asNet Buy (Net Sell) IPOs. We identify 190 Net Sell IPOs and 353 Net Buy
IPOs. We compute the ﬁrst month returns without ﬁrst day returns to exclude any potential effects of the
level of underpricing.
© 2013 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
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IPOs on the basis of subsequent insider trading at the time of the IPO. We, therefore,
assess the excess returns from the date of the buy and sell trades, rather than IPO date, to
allow investors to trade on such information. We run the Calendar time portfolio
regressions. The results in Table 4, Panel A, shows that the intercept awhichmeasures the
abnormal returns, is negative for buy but positive for sell trades, conﬁrming that directors
earn negative returns on their purchases, but share prices do not decrease after the sell
trades, in line with our results above.
Panel B. reports the results based on equally weighted returns. For the sample as a
whole, we ﬁnd but not report for space considerations that a is ‐0.9%, equivalent to CAR1,
36 of ‐36% reported in Panel B, Table 2, and b, the sum of bt and bt‐1 is 1.66, in line with
Ritter and Welch (2002) ﬁndings of 1.73, suggesting that our IPOs have relatively higher
risk and, thus, they should generate positive long‐term returns. Although this magnitude
of b is relatively homogeneous across all our sub‐samples, ranging between 1.45 for Net
Buy and 1.66 for Net Sell IPOs, a is ‐1.9%, ‐1.5% andþ2.1% for No Trade, Net Buy and
Net Sell IPOs, in line with our ﬁndings in Table 2.
The remaining results are in line with Ritter andWelch (2002) in terms of signs, but the
lagged coefﬁcients of SMB are predominantly insigniﬁcant. Similarly, the coefﬁcients of
the lagged HML are predominantly not signiﬁcant, but the coefﬁcient of HML is more
negative for theNet Sell IPOs. These results suggest that the exposure of the returns to size
and growth indices is only contemporaneous. The results based value‐weighted returns
reported in Panel C show that a is not signiﬁcant for No Trade IPOs, but positive for Net
Sell and negative for Net Buy IPOs.
3.5 The determinants of the long‐run performance
In this section, we run a set of regressions to assess whether the difference in the
performance of Net Buy and Net Sell IPOs holds after controlling for IPO fundamentals.
Table 5 reports the cross‐sectional regressions results. We useNPR, the net purchase ratio
based on number and value of the transactions to measure directors’ trading activity, and a
dummy variable for no insider trading. The last three columns replicate Regression (1) for
Net Buy, Net Sell and No Trade subsamples. The results indicate that all the three insider‐
trading variables affect negatively IPO long‐term performance. The negative coefﬁcient
of NPR implies that IPOs where directors are net buyers generate negative returns.
Similarly, No Trade dummy is negative and signiﬁcant, suggesting that IPOs not subject
to insider trading underperform signiﬁcantly more than their counterparts where directors
trade. These insider trading variables have also increased the explanatory power of the
regressions as previous studies report relatively much lower R2 of 1 to 8% (e.g.,
Levis, 2011; Goergen et al., 2007).12 Overall, our results suggest that insider trading is an
additional and signiﬁcant explanatory variable of the long‐run performance of IPOs.
The remaining explanatory variables expand the ﬁndings reported in previous studies. For
example, the relationship between long‐run performance and Underpricing is negative and
signiﬁcant in all our speciﬁcations, except in the Net Sell subsample, in line with previous
12Levis (2011) obtained an R2 of 1.4% for Non‐private equity backed, 7.5% for venture
capitalists‐backed and 0.05% for buyout IPOs. Goergen et al. (2007) report R2 for all ﬁrms of
8.45%. However, they report R2 of 6.38% and 13.58% for small ﬁrms and large ﬁrms
respectively.
© 2013 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
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evidence (e.g., Levis, 2011), suggesting that IPOs with high ﬁrst day returns generate lower
long‐term returns, in contrast to the predictions of the signalling models (Jenkinson and
Ljungqvist, 2001). The results also indicate that Prestigious Underwriters and VC backing
do not affect performance, in line with Levis (2011), but in contrast to Krishnan et al. (2011).
Size is negative, but not signiﬁcant, in contrast to Brav and Gompers (1997) who show that
underperformance is concentrated in small ﬁrms. We also ﬁnd a positive relationship
between long‐term returns and the lockup expiry dates excess returns, suggesting that IPOs
with high abnormal returns on the lockup expiry dates are more likely to have higher long‐
term returns, as insider are unlikely to have sold their holdings after the lockup, and, thus,
lower agency conﬂicts. In addition, the Lockup Length, High Tech, Hot market and Bubble
dummies, affect negatively the long‐term returns, unlike Levis (2011) who reports a
negative, but not signiﬁcant, coefﬁcient for bubble dummy. In unreported regressions, we
include an AIM dummy, however, it is never signiﬁcant. This is consistent with the
univariate results in Panel A, Table 2, where we ﬁnd no difference in long term performance
in IPOs listed on the AIM and Main Market.
We test for liquidity of the shares using Free ﬂoat, the proportion of money raised in
IPO relative to total market value of the company at the time of IPO, and Overhang,
deﬁned as shares retained to shares sold. In particular, we assess whether Net Sell IPOs
have a higher free ﬂoat, while Net Buy IPOs have low free ﬂoat, and following the buy
trades, liquidity, trading, and research might dry up, and consequently, a drop in the stock
price might follow. We ﬁnd, but not report for space considerations, that free ﬂoat is
signiﬁcantly correlated with Overhang (r ¼ 0.412, p ¼ 0.000), but not signiﬁcantly
related to our dependent variable, CAR36 in all our regressions. We think that the impact
of liquidity is better captured by overhang which is signiﬁcant in (3) to (5), but not in (6)
and in the subsample IPOs. Overall, these results suggest that liquidity is less likely to
drive our IPOs long‐term returns.
3.6 The determinants of insider trading in IPOs
In this section, we expand our analysis by assessing the likelihood of directors’ trading
through univariate analysis, and by running a set of logit regressions. We contrast further
the fundamental characteristics of IPOs in three different samples: Net Sell vs. No Trade,
Net Buy vs.No Trade, andNet Buy vs.Net Sell. Previous studies ﬁnd that insiders do trade
on private information (e.g., Seyhun, 1986; Korczak et al., 2010). The question is whether
they trade shortly before news announcements and violate insider trading rules, with
potential regulatory scrutiny and litigation, as well as potential political and reputational
costs,13 or whether the abnormal returns reﬂect the directors’ superior knowledge about
13See Korczak et al. (2010) for a recent review and the speciﬁcities of the UK vs. US
regulatory regimes and the difﬁculties in identifying what constitutes private information and
an insider, and thus, the complexities in enforcing the insider trading rules. UK regulation
prohibits trading by directors who possess any price sensitive information, and insider trading
is a criminal offence since the introduction of the Companies Act 1980. Unlike US, UK
directors are banned from trading in ‘prohibited periods’, which include ‘close periods’ of up
to 60 days associated with earnings announcement, and any periods when there is ‘any matter
which constitutes inside information in relation to the company’. Directors have also to get
clearance from the chairman.
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their ﬁrms’ prospects, and their ability to recognise pricing errors made by outside
investors.
We distinguish between these two possibilities by using SEO dummy and takeover
dummy to proxy for trading on news releases, since prospects for future deals grows after
IPO (Brau and Fawcett, 2006; Bancel and Mittoo, 2009) and, if they trade on mispricing,
they are expected to adopt contrarian strategies by buying (selling) stocks with poor
(good) past performance (e.g., Jenter, 2005; Lakonishok and Lee, 2001). To capture this
effect, we use the cumulative abnormal return 40 days before the trading dates, CAR‐40,‐2,
andmarket‐to‐book ratio, to assess whether directors buy a stockwhen it is selling at a low
valuation, and sell it when it has a high valuation over a longer horizon.
We also control for other fundamental factors that might affect directors’ trading.While
Peress (2010) reports that ﬁrm size affects trading propensity, Seyhun (1986) ﬁnds that
insiders are more likely to buy in small and sell in large ﬁrms. We use the natural
logarithm of market capitalisation, deﬁned as the IPO offer price times the number of
shares offered. In addition, previous studies also identiﬁed ownership as an additional
factor that might affect the propensity of insiders to trade. For example, Ofek and
Yermack (2000) report that executives with large shareholdings sell stock after receiving
new equity incentives to diversify their portfolios.We use Shares Locked, Lockup Length,
free ﬂoat, and Overhang. We control for outside ownership by including in our
regressions Institutional holdings, and VC backing. We use Prestigious Underwriters,14
Standard Deviation of returns and Underpricing to proxy for risk as previous studies
report that risky IPOs are underpriced more (see Ljungqvist (2007) for a review) and
Meulbroek (2000) ﬁnds that managers in more risky companies tend to sell equity more
aggressively. We use time dummies to control for market conditions.15
Table 6 reports the univariate analysis. The ﬁrst column reports the results for all IPOs
with directors’ trades. Consistent with the proposition that directors do not trade on
private information, IPOs where directors do not trade have a higher takeover probability.
Moreover, compared toNo Trade sample, the results show that directors aremore likely to
trade in IPOs with low underpricing, standard deviation of returns, and market–to‐book,
underwritten by prestigious underwriters, and backed by venture capitalists. These IPOs
also generate higher returns before the trade and on the lockup expiry date, are high
technology ﬁrms, but less likely to be issued in bubble period. These results appear to
suggest that directors are likely to trade in low risk IPOs.
We then focus on differences between Net Sell, Net Buy, and No Trade samples. The
results indicate that Net Sell IPOs have lower free ﬂoat, lockup lengths and risk, higher
pre‐trade returns and lockup expiry returns, are more likely to be underwritten by
prestigious underwriters, less likely to be issued in bubble and hot periods, or to be taken
over than Net Buy and No Trade sub‐samples. In addition, they have lower underpricing
and fraction of shares locked, and less likely to be backed by venture capitalists, than the
14Following Derrien and Kecskes (2007) these include global investment banks such as ABN
AMRO (Hoare Govett), Cazenove & Co., Credit Lyonnais Securities, Dresdner Kleinwort
Wassertein, HSBC Securities, Credit Suisse, Investec Hendersen Crosthwaite securities, KBC
Securities, Peel Hunt, Lehman brothers, Nomura, Schroder Salomon Smith Barney, SG
securities, UBS, West LB, Merrill Lynch International, Goldman Sachs.
15Bubble period is 1999–2000 (Levis, 2011), and hot period is high IPO volume in 2000 and
2004–2006.
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Table 6
Characteristics of IPOs with and without Director Trades within 3‐years of IPO
IPOs with directors’ trades No trade IPOs
p‐value of x2
All Net sell Net buy
(4)(1) (2) (3)
No of IPOs 543 190 353 287
Takeover probability (%) 23.38a 18.94bc 25.77d 41.46 0.00
SEO dummy (%) 16.60 13.68 17.56 13.93 0.11
Market‐to‐book 6.31a 6.67b 5.17d 7.44 0.05
CAR(‐40,‐2) (%) 1.01
a 5.88bc 1.58d 3.29 0.00
Size (2008 £m) 149.2 175.3 135.5 123.2 0.20
Shares locked (%) 93.98 92.2c 94.95 95.5 0.12
Lockup length 388.5 378.5bc 395.0 398.3 0.20
Free float 38.15 35.58 bc 39.54 39.76 0.09
Overhang (%) 3.82 4.41 3.51 3.99 0.23
Institutional holding (%) 60.7 58.9 59.94 63.41 0.16
Venture backed (%) 15.83a 17.89c 14.77d 10.45 0.05
Underpricing (%) 19.58a 15.62c 21.78 28.18 0.10
Prestigious underwriter (%) 23.38a 27.36bc 21.30d 13.93 0.00
Lockup expiry returns (%) 1.59 0.63bc 2.10 2.44 0.10
High tech dummy (%) 11.23a 10.00 11.89d 8.34 0.17
Bubble dummy (%) 19.33a 14.70bc 21.18d 27.18 0.00
Hot dummy (%) 80.29a 76.84bc 82.15d 87.80 0.00
Standard deviation 0.029a 0.026bc 0.030 0.031 0.01
This table presents the characteristics of IPOs with and without directors’ trades within 3‐years of IPO. The sample
includes 287 IPOs without insider trading, and 543 IPOs with insider trading, split into 190 Net Sell and 353 Net Buy
IPOs. Takeover Probability is a dummy constructed by following Brar et al. (2008). SEODummy takes value of one if
the IPO raised further Equity within 3‐years of IPO. CAR(‐40,‐2) are the cumulative abnormal return over pre‐event
window. For the no trade sample, wemeasure the 39‐day abnormal return as the abnormal return over thewhole period
standardised to 39 days. Size is the market value of equity in 2008 constant terms. Shares locked is the ratio of shares
locked relative to shares sold in the IPO. Lockup length is the lockup period in days. Free ﬂoat deﬁned as the
proportion of money raised in IPO relative to total market value of the company. Overhang is the ratio of proportion
retained to proportion sold. InstitutionalHolding is the proportion of companieswhere institutions holdmore than 3%.
Venture‐backed is the proportion of IPOs backed by venture capitalist. Underpricing is the percent return on the ﬁrst
day from the offering price to the closing price. Prestigious underwriter is equal to 1 if a global investment bank
deﬁned in Derrien and Kecskes (2007) has underwritten the issue. Lockup expiry returns is the Cumulative abnormal
return over 2 to þ 2 around lockup expiration. High‐tech Dummy is equal to one if the IPO is in computer
manufacturing, electronic equipment, computer and data processing services, and optical, medical and scientiﬁc
equipment.Bubble period is equal to 1 if the IPO is issued in 1999–2000 period following Levis (2011).Hot market is
equal to 1 if the IPO is during January 1999 to March 2001 and January 2004 to end of 2006. Cold market is the
remaining sample period. Standard Deviation of returns is measured across the 36 months after the IPO.We report p‐
values for the mean difference test between different subsamples. a, b, c, d indicate signiﬁcant differences between IPOs
with insider trading vs.No Trade, Net Sell vs.Net Buy, Net Sell vs. No Trade, and Net Buy vs.No Trade, respectively.
x2 tests for homogeneity across the No Trade, Net Sell, and Net Buy samples. ***, **, * denotes signiﬁcant at 0.01,
0.05, and 0.1 levels, respectively.
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No Trade IPOs, but a higher risk than Net Buy IPOs. Compared to the No Trade IPOs, the
Net Buy IPOs are more likely to be underwritten by prestigious underwriters and backed
by venture capitalists, more likely to be high tech but less likely to be issued in hot period
or to be taken over. They also generate relatively higher returns before the trades, but they
have low market‐to‐book ratio, suggesting that they are likely to be undervalued. These
results suggest that directors sell in IPOs with relatively shorter lockup lengths and a
smaller proportion of shares locked, but they appear to undertake their trades after the
lockup expiry date, as the abnormal returns on that date are signiﬁcantly lower than the
remaining IPOs. In addition, they have the best underwriters, have low risk and generate
highest returns, suggesting that the underwriters are likely to be happy for them to sell, as
the usual negative signal of sell trades is likely to be small. In contrast, the Net Buy IPOs
have strong underwriters, but more risky and generate low returns before the trade and
their lowmarket‐to‐book ratio suggest that they are undervalued. These results imply that
directors buy stocks to support the decrease in prices. Contrary to Seyhun (1986), our
results do not suggest that directors buy in small IPOs.
Table 7 reports the logit results.16 For each group, we run two regressions to account for
multicollinearity, particularly between Size and Prestigious Underwriters. In equation (1)
and (2), we assess the probability that directors are net sellers by comparingNet Sell IPOs,
set equal to 1, against No Trade IPOs, equal to 0. The results indicate that the pre‐trade
stock price performance affect signiﬁcantly the decision to sell rather than not to trade, in
line with previous insider trading literature (e.g., Seyhun, 1986; Korczak et al., 2010). The
positive and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient of CAR(‐40,‐2) suggests that directors sell in IPOs with
signiﬁcant increase in share prices, 38 trading days before the trade. These results are
consistent with the notion that directors adopt contrarian strategies in their sell trades, but
they appear to suggest that directors are more concerned with the short‐term run up in
share prices rather than the long‐term valuation of their IPO, as the coefﬁcient of market to
book,MB, is not signiﬁcant. Directors are more likely to sell in IPOs that are large, backed
by venture capitalists, and where free ﬂoat is low. Although these results suggest that
directors sell in less risky ﬁrms, the coefﬁcient of the standard deviation of returns is
negative and not signiﬁcant. The coefﬁcient of the takeover probability is negative and
signiﬁcant, suggesting that directors are less likely to sell on private information for fear of
litigation, political and reputational risks. The results based on non‐correlated variables,
reported in Equation (2) are relatively similar, except that the coefﬁcient of Prestigious
Underwriters is positive and signiﬁcant.
Equations (3) and (4) report the results of Net Buy, relative to No Trade. Interestingly,
while the coefﬁcient of CAR is not signiﬁcant, that of market to book,MB, is negative and
signiﬁcant, consistent with Lakonishok and Lee (2001) and Jenter (2005), and suggesting
that directors buy stocks if they consider that their ﬁrm is undervalued in the long‐ not
short‐run. In addition, unlike Net Sell IPOs, ﬁrm size is positive and AIM dummy is
negative, but not signiﬁcant. However, in line with the ﬁrst two columns, the results
indicate that directors are less likely to buy when the probability of a takeover is high,
probably to comply with the legal requirements.
Equations (5) and (6) report the probability of Net Buy vs. Net Sell. The results are
relatively similar to the univariate ﬁndings in Table 5. In particular, the CAR(‐40,‐2) of Net
16We include year dummies.We ﬁnd, but not report, similar results using bubble, hot and high
tech dummies.
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Buy IPOs are signiﬁcantly lower than those of Net Sell IPOs, conﬁrming the contrarian
strategies adopted by directors.Net Buy IPOs are also smaller and more likely to be issued
on AIM than Net Sell IPOs. Surprisingly, these IPOs have already a higher proportion of
the directors’ ownership which is locked, the lockup length is signiﬁcantly longer, and the
free ﬂoat higher than the Net Sell IPOs. The remaining variables are relatively similar
across the two samples.
Finally, Equation (7) and (8) reports the multivariate logit regression results where
the dependent variable is equal to 2 for Net Sell, 1 for Net Buy, and 0 for No Trade IPOs.
The results show that the pre‐trade CARs are positive and signiﬁcant, suggesting that
these CARs are signiﬁcantly higher for the Net Sell IPOs. These IPOs are also more likely
to be backed by venture capitalists, issued on the Main market, and to be signiﬁcantly
larger, but they have lower proportion of shares locked, lower probability of takeover and
market‐to‐book ratio.
4. Conclusion
We ﬁnd strong relationship between directors’ trading and the long‐run returns of IPOs.
As far as we are aware, our paper is unique, as previous studies did not consider these two
issues simultaneously. We show that UK IPOs underperform in the long‐run, in line with
previous studies, but those where directors are net sellers generate substantial positive
returns, and their Fama and French (1993) alpha coefﬁcients are constantly positive. In
contrast, IPOs where directors are net buyers and those not subject to insider trading have
negative returns. Our results hold when we use the event study methodology to analyse
short‐term returns and the various methodologies to assess long‐term returns, and when
we account for all other factors that might affect the long‐term returns in regression
settings.
Although our results indicate that IPO directors are less likely to trade on insider
information, and, thus, there is no transfer of wealth from uninformed to informed
investors, they are puzzling as they indicate that the stock returns following the sell trades
are not negative, and, for the buy trades, they are negative suggesting that directors do not
reverse their IPO performance, systematically make losses on purchases, and the market
does not value their buy trades. We rationalise these results by arguing that directors may
simply sell when they know that their IPO has reached its optimal valuation, but they
purchase more stock in their underperforming IPO to avoid admitting failure implicitly, in
line with the disposition effect in behavioural ﬁnance. Alternatively, since unlike
seasoned ﬁrms, there is a greater uncertainty about the value of IPOs, the information of
directors is likely to be less precise. We suggest that further research is required to assess
these factors, together with the possibility of the directors trading before news
announcements, as in Korczak et al. (2010), the impact of private equity‐backed IPOs, as
in Levis (2011), the direct link between corporate brokers in the UK and trading by
directors, and the trading by directors in the derivatives market to avoid the potential
scrutiny by the regulators.
References
Bancel, F. and Mittoo, U.R., ‘Why do European ﬁrms go public?’, European Financial Management,
Vol. 15, 2009, pp. 844–84.
© 2013 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
24 Haﬁz Hoque and Meziane Lasfer
UN
CO
RR
EC
TE
D 
PR
OO
FS
Barberis, N. and Thaler, R., ‘A survey of behavioural ﬁnance’, in G. Constantinides, M. Harris R. Stultz,
eds Handbook of the Economics of Finance (North Holland, Amsterdam Elsevier Science 2003),
pp. 1053–112.
Benveniste, L.M. and Spindt, P.A., ‘How investment bankers determine the offer price and allocation of
new issues’, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 24, 1989, pp. 343–61.
Brar G., Giamouridis, D. and Liodakis, M., ‘Predicting European takeover targets’, European Financial
Management, Vol. 15, 2008, pp. 430–50.
Brau, J.C. and Fawcett, S.E., ‘Initial public offerings: an analysis of theory and practice’, Journal of
Finance, Vol. 61, 2006, pp. 399–436.
Brau, J.C., Couch, R.B. and Sutton, N.K., ‘The desire to acquire and IPO long‐run underperformance’,
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 47, 2012, pp. 493–510.
Brav, A. and Gompers, P.A., ‘The long run underperformance of initial public offerings: evidence from
venture and non‐venture capital‐backed companies’, Journal of Finance, Vol. 52, 1997, pp. 1791–
1821.
Brav, A. and Gompers, P.A., ‘The role of lockups in initial public offerings’, Review of Financial
Studies, Vol. 16, 2003, pp. 1–29.
Brav, A., Geczy, C. and Gompers, P.A., ‘Is the abnormal return following equity issuance anomalous’,
Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 56, 2000, pp. 209–49.
Carter, R.B. and Manaster, S., Initial public offerings and underwriter reputation, Journal of Finance,
Vol. 45, 1990, pp. 1045–67.
Carter, R.B., Dark, F.H., Floros, I.V. and Sapp, T.R.A., ‘Characterizing the risk of IPO long‐run returns:
the impact of momentum, liquidity, skewness, and investment’, Financial Management, Vol. 40,
2011, pp. 1067–86.
Chambers, D. and Dimson, E., ‘IPO underpricing over the very long run’, Journal of Finance, Vol. 64,
2009, pp. 1407–44.
Derrien, F. and Kecskes, A., The initial public offering of listed ﬁrms, Journal of Finance, Vol. 62, 2007,
pp. 447–79.
Doukas, J. and Gonenc, H., ‘Long‐term performance of new equity issuers, venture capital and
reputation of investment bankers’, Economic Notes, Vol. 34, 2005, pp. 1–34.
Eckbo, B.E., Masulis, R. and Norli, O., ‘Security issuance’, in B. Espen Eckbo, ed., Handbook of
Corporate Finance: Empirical Corporate Finance, Volume 1 ( Elsevier/North‐Holland Handbooks in
Finance Series, 2007), pp. 233–373.
Espenlaub, S, Gregory A. and Tonks, I., ‘Re‐assessing the long term performance of UK Initial Public
Offerings’, European Financial Management, Vol. 6, 2000, pp. 319–42.
Espenlaub, S., Goergen, M. and Khurshed, A., ‘IPO lock‐in agreements in the UK’, Journal of Business
Finance and Accounting, Vol. 28, 2001, pp. 1235–78.
Fama, E.F. and French, K.R., ‘Common risk factors in the returns on stocks and bonds’, Journal of
Financial Economics, Vol. 33, 1993, pp. 3–56.
Fama, E.F., ‘Market efﬁciency, long‐term returns, and behavioral ﬁnance’, Journal of Financial
Economics, Vol. 49, 1998, pp. 283–306.
Fidrmuc, J., Goergen M. and Renneboog, L., ‘Insider trading, news release and ownership
concentration’, Journal of Finance, Vol. 61, 2006, 2931–73
Field, L.C. and Hanka, G., ‘The expiration of IPO share lockups’, Journal of Finance, Vol. 56, 2001,
pp. 471–500.
Finn, F. and Higham, R., ‘The performance of unseasoned new equity issues‐cum‐stock exchange
listings in Australia’, Journal of banking and Finance, Vol. 12, 1988, pp. 333–51.
Goergen, M., Renneboog, L. and Khurshed A., ‘Explaining the diversity in shareholder lockup
agreements’, Journal of Financial Intermediation, Vol. 15, 2006, pp 254‐80.
Goergen, M., Khurshed A. and Mudambi, R., ‘The long run performance of UK IPOs: can it be
predicted? ‘Managerial Finance, Vol. 33, 2007, pp 401–19.
Grossman, S.J. and Stiglitz, J.E., ‘On the impossibility of informationally efﬁcient markets’, American
Economic Review, Vol. 70, 1980, pp. 393–408.
© 2013 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
Directors’ Dealing and Post‐IPO Performance 25
UN
CO
RR
EC
TE
D 
PR
OO
FS
Hillier, D. and Marshall, A., ‘Are trading bans effective? Exchange regulation and corporate insider
transactions around earnings announcements’, Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 8, 2002, pp. 393–
410.
Hoque, H. and Lasfer, M., ‘IPO lockup arrangements and trading by insiders’ Working Paper (Cass
Business School, London, 2009) Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract¼1344748
Huddart, S. and Ke, B., ‘Information asymmetry and cross‐section variation in insider trading’,
Contemporary Accounting Research, Vol. 24, 2007, pp. 195–232.
Jain, B.A. and Kini, O., The post issue operating performance of IPO ﬁrms, Journal of Finance, Vol. 49,
1994, pp. 1699–1726.
Jenkinson, T. and Ljungqvist, A., The Theory and Evidence on How Companies Raise Equity Finance
( Oxford Oxford University Press 2001 ).
Jensen, M. and Meckling, W., ‘Theory of the ﬁrm: managerial behavior, agency cost and ownership
structure’, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 3, 1976, pp. 306–60.
Jenter, D., ‘Market timing and managerial portfolio decisions’, Journal of Finance, Vol. 60, 2005,
pp. 1903–49.
Jiang X. and Zaman, M.A., ‘Aggregate insider trading: contrarian beliefs or superior information’,
Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 34, 2010, pp. 1225–36.
Kaustia, M., ‘Market‐wide impact of the disposition effect: evidence from IPO trading volume’, Journal
of Financial Markets, Vol. 7, 2004, pp. 207–35.
Keloharju,M., ‘Thewinner’s curse legal liability, and the long run performance of initial public offerings
in Finland’, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 34, 1993, pp. 251–77.
Korczak, A., Korczak, P. and Lasfer, M., ‘To trade or not to trade: the strategic trading of directors
around news announcements’, Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, Vol. 37, 2010, pp. 369–
407.
Krishnan, C.N.V., Ivanov, V.I., Masulis, R.W. and Singh, A.K., ‘Venture capital reputation, post‐IPO
performance, and corporate governance’, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 46,
2011, pp. 1295–1333.
Kunz, R.M. and Aggarwal, R., ‘Why initial public offerings are underpriced: evidence from
Switzerland’, Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 18, 1994, pp. 705–24.
Kyle, A.S., ‘Continuous auctions and directors’ share trading’, Econometrica Vol. 53, 1985, pp. 1315–
35.
Lakonishok, J. and Lee, I., ‘Are insider trades informative’? Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 14, 2001,
pp. 79–111.
Levis M., ‘The Long run performance of initial public offerings: the UK experience 1980‐1988 ’,
Financial Management, Vol. 22, 1993, pp. 28–41.
Levis M., ‘The performance of private equity‐backed IPOs’, Financial Management, Vol. 40, 2011,
pp. 253–77.
Ljungqvist, A.P. ‘IPO underpricing’, in B. Espen Eckbo ed., Handbook of Corporate Finance:
Empirical Corporate Finance, Vol. 1 (Elsevier/North‐Holland Handbooks in Finance Series, 2007),
pp. 375–422.
Marin, J.M. and Olivier, J., ‘The dog that did not bark: insider trading and crashes’, Journal of Finance,
Vol. 63, 2008, pp. 2429–76.
Meulbroek, L.K. ‘Does risk matter? Corporate insider transactions in internet‐based ﬁrms’, Working
Paper (Harvard Business School, 2000), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract¼220128
Mikkelson, W.H, Partch, M.M. and Shah, K., Ownership and operating performance of companies that
go public, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 44, 1997, pp. 281–307.
Myers, S.C. and Majluf, N.S., ‘Corporate ﬁnancing and investment decisions when ﬁrms have
information that investors do not have’, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 13, 1984, pp. 187–221.
Peress, J., ‘Product market competition, insider trading, and stock market efﬁciency’, Journal of
Finance, Vol. 65, 2010, pp. 1–43.
Ofek, E. and Yermack, D., ‘Taking stock: equity‐based compensation and the evolution of managerial
ownership’, Journal of Finance, Vol. 55, 2000, pp. 1367–84.
© 2013 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
26 Haﬁz Hoque and Meziane Lasfer
UN
CO
RR
EC
TE
D 
PR
OO
FS
Ritter, J.R., ‘The long‐run performance of Initial Public Offerings’ Journal of Finance, 46, 1991,
pp. 3–27.
Ritter, J.R. and Welch, I.I., ‘A review of IPO activity, pricing and allocations’, Journal of Finance,
Vol. 57, 2002, pp 1795–1828.
Ritter, J.R. ‘Investment banking and securities issuance’ in G. Constantinides, M. M. Harris and R. M.
Stulz, Handbook of the Economics of Finance, Vol 1A, Corporate Finance (Elsevier, North Holland
2003), Ch. 5.
Seyhun, H.N., ‘Insiders’ proﬁts, costs of trading, and market efﬁciency’, Journal of Financial
Economics, Vol. 16, 1986, pp. 189–212.
Seyhun, H.N., Investment Intelligence: from Insider Trading (MIT Press, Cambridge MA 1998).
Subrahmanyam, A., ‘Behavioural ﬁnance: a review and synthesis’, European Financial Management,
Vol. 14, 2007, 12–29
Thomadakis, S., Nounis, C. and Gounopoulos, D., ‘Long term performance of Greek IPOs’, European
Financial Management, Vol. 18, 2012, 117–41
Vismara, S., Paleari, S. and Ritter, J.R., ‘Europe’s second markets for small companies’, European
Financial Management, Vol. 18, 2012, 352–88
© 2013 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
Directors’ Dealing and Post‐IPO Performance 27
 USING e-ANNOTATION TOOLS FOR ELECTRONIC PROOF CORRECTION  
 
Required software to e-Annotate PDFs: Adobe Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader (version 8.0 or 
above). (Note that this document uses screenshots from Adobe Reader X) 
The latest version of Acrobat Reader can be downloaded for free at: http://get.adobe.com/reader/ 
 
Once you have Acrobat Reader open on your computer, click on the Comment tab at the right of the toolbar:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Replace (Ins) Tool – for replacing text. 
 
Strikes a line through text and opens up a text 
box where replacement text can be entered. 
How to use it 
 Highlight a word or sentence. 
 Click on the Replace (Ins) icon in the Annotations 
section. 
 Type the replacement text into the blue box that 
appears. 
This will open up a panel down the right side of the document. The majority of 
tools you will use for annotating your proof will be in the Annotations section, 
pictured opposite. We’ve picked out some of these tools below: 
 
2. Strikethrough (Del) Tool – for deleting text. 
 
Strikes a red line through text that is to be 
deleted. 
How to use it 
 Highlight a word or sentence. 
 Click on the Strikethrough (Del) icon in the 
Annotations section. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Add note to text Tool – for highlighting a section 
to be changed to bold or italic. 
 
Highlights text in yellow and opens up a text 
box where comments can be entered. 
How to use it 
 Highlight the relevant section of text. 
 Click on the Add note to text icon in the 
Annotations section. 
 Type instruction on what should be changed 
regarding the text into the yellow box that 
appears. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Add sticky note Tool – for making notes at 
specific points in the text. 
Marks a point in the proof where a comment 
needs to be highlighted. 
How to use it 
 Click on the Add sticky note icon in the 
Annotations section. 
 Click at the point in the proof where the comment 
should be inserted. 
 Type the comment into the yellow box that 
appears. 
 USING e-ANNOTATION TOOLS FOR ELECTRONIC PROOF CORRECTION  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For further information on how to annotate proofs, click on the Help menu to reveal a list of further options: 
5. Attach File Tool – for inserting large amounts of 
text or replacement figures. 
 
Inserts an icon linking to the attached file in the 
appropriate pace in the text. 
How to use it 
 Click on the Attach File icon in the Annotations 
section. 
 Click on the proof to where you’d like the attached 
file to be linked. 
 Select the file to be attached from your computer 
or network. 
 Select the colour and type of icon that will appear 
in the proof. Click OK. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. Add stamp Tool – for approving a proof if no 
corrections are required. 
 
Inserts a selected stamp onto an appropriate 
place in the proof. 
How to use it 
 Click on the Add stamp icon in the Annotations 
section. 
 Select the stamp you want to use. (The Approved 
stamp is usually available directly in the menu that 
appears). 
 Click on the proof where you’d like the stamp to 
appear. (Where a proof is to be approved as it is, 
this would normally be on the first page). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7. Drawing Markups Tools – for drawing shapes, lines and freeform 
annotations on proofs and commenting on these marks. 
Allows shapes, lines and freeform annotations to be drawn on proofs and for 
comment to be made on these marks.. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
How to use it 
 Click on one of the shapes in the Drawing 
Markups section. 
 Click on the proof at the relevant point and 
draw the selected shape with the cursor. 
 To add a comment to the drawn shape, 
move the cursor over the shape until an 
arrowhead appears. 
 Double click on the shape and type any 
text in the red box that appears. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MARKED PROOF
Please correct and return this set
Please use the proof correction marks shown below for all alterations and corrections. If you 
wish to return your proof by fax you should ensure that all amendments are written clearly
Proof Correction Marks
Please correct and return your proofs using the proof correction marks below.  For a more 
detailed look at using these marks please reference the most recent edition of The Chicago 
Manual of Style and visit them on the Web at: http://www.chicagomanualofstyle.org/home.
html
Instruction to printer
Leave unchanged under matter to remain
through single character, rule or underline
New matter followed by
or
or
ornew character
new characters
through all characters to be deleted
through letter   or
through characters
under matter to be changed
under matter to be changed
under matter to be changed
under matter to be changed
under matter to be changed
Encircle matter to be changed
or
indicated in the margin
Delete
Substitute character or
substitute part of one or
more word(s)
Change to italics
Change to capitals
Change to small capitals
Change to bold type
Change to bold italic
Change to lower case
Insert in text the matter
Textual mark Marginal mark
followed by ne  
matter
through single character, rule or underline
through all characters to be dele ed
B
or
ore.g.
under character
over character(As above)
through character    or
where required
Insert ‘superior’ character
Insert ‘inferior’ character
struction to typesetter
superscript
Insert subscript
 under character
e.g.
 over character
e.g.
(As above)
(As above)
Insert full stop
Insert comma
linking characters
through character    or
where required
Transpose
Close up
Insert or substitute space
between characters or words
or
or
and/or(As above)Insert double quotation marks
(As above)Insert single quotation marks
(As above)Insert hyphen
Start new paragraph
between characters or
words affected
Reduce space between
characters or words
t r  si l  r t , r l  r rli
through all ch r cters to b  deleted
f llow d by new 
